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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KIRK W. DALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF UTAH, THE UTAH STATE
BOARD OF PARDONS, and THE UTAH
STATE PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY
REVIEW BOARD,

Case No. 930722-CA
Priority No. 3

Respondents.
STATUTES. RULES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The

following

statutes,

rules,

and

constitutional

provisions are relevant to a determination of this matter, and are
set forth in Addendum F to Mr. Dall's opening brief:
U. S.
U. S.
U. S.
U.S.
U.S.
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Const, art. I, § 10, cl
Const, amend. V
Const, amend. VI
Cons t. amend. VI11
Const amend. XIV,
Const. art I, § 7
Const. art I, § 9
Const. art I, § 12
Const. art I, § 18
Const. art V, § 1
Const. art VIII, § 5
Code Ann. § 17-5-89 (1991)
Code Ann § 62A-12-209(1) (Supp. 1992)
Code Ann § 62A-12-229 (Supp. 1992)
Code Ann § 62A-12-223 (1989)
Code Ann § 62A-12-240 (Supp. 1992)
Code Ann § 62A-12-241 (Supp. 1992)
Code Ann § 76-2-305(4) (1990)
Code Ann § 77-16-5 (1990) (enacted 1980)
Code Ann § 77-16a-5 (effective March 13, 1990)
Code Ann § 77-16a-203(3)(a) (effective July 1, 1992)
Code Ann § 77-38-2(6) (1989)
Code Ann § 77-38-2(6) (effective March 13, 1990)

§§ 62A-12-241,
here.

77-16-5,

and 77-16a-5 are attached as Addendum D

CORRECTION OF ERRATA
The State asserts that Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-16-1 and -5
were repealed in 1992. State's Brief at 6.

This statute has never

been repealed.1
The correct citation for In re Estate of Bartell. cited
in State's Brief at 4, is 776 P.2d 885

(Utah 1985).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although the State sets forth a bifurcated standard of
review (no deference to PSRB, but deference to trial court findings
based on live testimony) , it fails to specify any fact findings
which were based on testimony at the evidentiary hearing.
In its brief, the only evidence from the evidentiary
hearing cited by the State concerns the testimony of Mr. Verville
about the clinical standards used for transfer of people from the
hospital to the prison.

State's Brief at 15-17.

Mr. Dall is not

challenging Mr. Verville's opinions on this matter.

Whether his

opinion

accorded

is

legally

correct

is a question

of

law

no

deference. Thus, for all practical purposes this Court's review is
entirely non-deferential.

Petitioner accurately noted that § 77-16-5 is still in effect
in his prehearing memorandum at p. 10 n.9 (R. 288-323 at 297 n.9),
and again in his trial brief at 30 n.10 (R. 375-461 at 411 n.10).
The trial court erroneously indicated that this section was
repealed in 1990 in its signed minute entry decision at p. 3 (R.
492-500 at 494). In his post judgment motion at p. 8 %2 (R. 503511 at 510 %2) , petitioner again pointed out that § 77-16-5 has
never been repealed.
2
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POINT I . BURGESS
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MR. PALL'S CLAIMS.
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Mr. Ball falls
. ,, A* I.
terms of § 7 7 16 -5, as he
pled guilty and ment^-u.^ J.^.1 to fo. ^J_ C sexual abuse, an offense
specifically enumerated in § 77-16-1. While a possible argument
could be made that §§ 77-16-1 et seq. should also apply to the
offense of sexual abuse of a child, no such claim was presented to
the Burgess court, and the opinion fails to address the issue. Any
claim concerning § G2A-12-241 •„-.
" kewise not raised or addressed
in Burgess.
3

Mr. Burgess was not prejudiced because the later statute is more
beneficial to him.
claims ex post

facto

870 P. 2d at 280 and n.6.

In contrast, Mr. Dall

application because both § 77-16-5 and § 62A-

12-241 are more beneficial to him, and he has been prejudiced.
The State erroneously asserts that "[s] tatutory language
when Dall committed his crime contained no guidance to steer either
the

hospital's

discretion

in

discharging

discretion in committing him to prison."

him

or

the

Board's

State's Brief at 15, see

also id. at 17 ("pre-1990 transfer provision (which contained no
standards)").

Counsel for the State inexplicably ignores § 77-16-5

and § 62A-12-241, despite extensive discussion of these statutes in
Mr. Dall's Opening Brief at 30-33.
The State's assertion that a guilty and mentally ill plea
does not invoke § 77-16-5, State's Brief at 17-18 n.6, demonstrates
a

fundamental misunderstanding

statutory scheme by the State.

of the guilty and mentally

ill

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-l(3)

("The defendant shall be advised that a plea of guilty and mentally
ill is a plea of guilty . . .") (repealed July 1, 1992); Utah Code
Ann.

§ 77-16a-103 (3) (a)

(same)

(effective July 1, 1992).

The

guilty and mentally ill scheme focuses on the defendant's mental
state at sentencing, and triggers an automatic assessment of the
defendant's mental state.

For all other purposes, a guilty and

mentally ill plea is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.
State v. Young, 853 P. 2d 327, 384-5 (Utah 1993) (opinion of Durham,
Zimmerman, and Stewart, J J . ) .

In fact, defendants are free to
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POINT II. MR. DALL HAS FULLY MARSHALLED THE
EVIDENCE.
(Responding to State's Brief at Point II, pp. 18-9)
The State relies on a blanket marshalling argument to
dismiss

Mr.

Dall's

sufficiency

of

the

evidence

claim.

Significantly, the State fails to give a single example of any
scrap of evidence that Mr. Dall has failed to marshal.3

The

evidence here is fully marshalled, and Mr. Dall's claim should be
addressed on the merits.
Mr. Dall properly cited the marshalling
Opening

Brief

at

3,

and

complied

with

its

requirement,

mandate.

It

is

undisputed that the State called no witnesses at the June 28, 1991
PSRB hearing, as correctly found by the trial court.

R.

569

(Findings %9) . There is thus no evidence presented by the State to
be marshalled.
Looking at the evidence presented by Mr. Dall's witness,
Dr.

Philip Washburn, the only evidence supporting

position

is

testimony

concerning

the

"plateau"

the

that

State's

had

been

reached in Mr. Dall's treatment. Mr. Dall marshalled this evidence
presented by this (the only) witness.

See Opening Brief at 18-25.

Mr. Dall discussed Dr. Washburn's discussion of how Mr. Dall had
reached a plateau in his treatment, and has demonstrated on appeal
that the PSRB's finding of maximum benefit is so lacking in support
as to be against the clear weight of the evidence.

3

The reason is simple: there is no unmarshalled evidence.
6
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POINT III. THE STATE'S PROPOSED DEFINITION OF
"MAXIMUM BENEFIT" IS UNSUPPORTED BY ANY
PRECEDENT, AND IS MERELY A POST HOC
JUSTIFICATION OF THE PSRB'S ACTION.
(Responding to the State's Brief at Point III, pp.
20-22)
The State asserts, without any citation to the record,
that

lf

[t]he evidence at the PSRB hearing, repeated at the trial

court, was that Dall had received all the help from the state
hospital that he could receive from the hospital and that the state
prison could provide him the same treatment."
This

is a mischaracterization

of

State's Brief at 21.

the evidence.

In its

fact

statement, the State cites PSRB at 41 for this proposition.

The

State's discussion of the evidence at the PSRB hearing in total is
as follows:
Dr. Washburn testified that Dall had reached a
plateau and his condition had stabilized to the point
that he no longer required the services of the hospital.
(Id. at 41). However, Dr. Washburn made it clear that
Dall would continue to need treatment, although the
treatment would be of a stabilizing, rather than a
curative, nature. Indeed, Dr. Washburn stated that were
it not for Dall's criminal sentence, the hospital
probably would have already discharged him from the
hospital to another setting. (Jd. at 50) .
State's Brief at 9.4
A

review

of

this

testimony

is

underwhelming.

Dr.

Washburn's testimony was that Mr. Dall had been stabilized, but
that he had not received maximum benefit.
B).

PSRB at 39-45 (Addendum

The hospital was recommending transfer for economic reasons,

4

Pages 41 and 50 are both cited and discussed in Mr. Dall's
Opening Brief. See id. at 24. The State's marshalling argument is
a baseless attempt to avoid the merits.
8

despite Mr. Dall's not having received maximum benefit.

PSRB at

21-22, 49-51 (Addendum C ) .
Now, for the very first time, the State has proposed its
definition of maximum benefit:
(1) the patient has received medication and other forms
of treatment at the hospital and his mental functioning
has improved; (2) the patient's condition has remained
stable for a reasonable time; and [sic] (3) the state
hospital has no additional medications or therapeutic
forms of treatment that will further improve the
patient's mental condition; and (4) another institution,
such as the prison, can provide treatment suitable to
maintain the patient's current condition.
State's

Brief

at

21.

This

self

serving

description

of

the

treatment afforded Mr. Dall is wholly unrelated to the statutory
standard of maximum benefit codified in § 77-16a-5 (now § 77-16a203 (3) (a)).

While perhaps the statutes should speak in terms of

stabilization rather than maximum benefit, see PSRB at 23-4, 34-5,
they do not.

The plain language of the statute does not permit

"maximum benefit" to be stretched to the lengths suggested by the
State.

POINT IV.
MR. PALL'S EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND
ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 ARGUMENTS ARE RIPE
AND MERITORIOUS.
(Responding to State's Brief at Point IV, pp. 2224)
Contrary to the State's assertion that Mr. "Dall has
never been at

the prison," State's Brief

at 22, Mr. Dall

is

currently at the prison, and has been there since this Court denied
his motion for stay by order dated January 14, 1994.

9

Counsel has visited Mr. Ball at the prison (May 4, 1994) ,
spoken to him on the phone, and received correspondence from him.
Mr.

Ball

reports

that

he

is housed

in

the

general

prison

population, and is currently receiving no mental health treatment
at all.

His requests to see Br. Van Austin have been denied,

citing the State Hospital's determination that Mr. Ball is no
longer mentally

ill.

Correspondence

received

from Mr. Ball

suggests that he is far from being mentally healthy.
Regardless of whether it would be cruel or unusual or
constitute unnecessary rigor to house Mr. Ball at the prison while
keeping him on proper medication, the State has failed to achieve
even this.

Mr. Ball is not receiving any treatment at all, see

also R. 565 (letter to Judge Lewis) , despite his need for such
treatment. Bespite the prison's apparent ability to provide mental
health treatment to Mr. Ball, as a result of administrative
convenience, whim, or caprice the prison is refusing to provide any
treatment to him.
In light of the present circumstances, if this Court
declines to reverse on a different basis it would be appropriate to
remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing concerning
Mr. Ball's current condition and lack of necessary treatment at the
prison.

10

POINT

V.
NO JUDICIAL OFFICER HAS EVER
DETERMINED THAT MR. PALL SHOULD BE SENT
TO PRISON.

(Responding to State's Brief at Point V, pp. 24-26)
The State glosses over the fact that Judge Hanson never
determined that Mr. Dall should go to prison.

To the contrary, he

specifically found that prison would not be appropriate.
63-70.

Rather

than

being

a

mere

"administrative

Sent, at
placement

process," the determination that an offender should go to prison is
a core judicial function that to date has not been performed in Mr.
Dall's case.

POINT VI.
EXTRAORDINARY WRITS ARE NOT THE
TYPE OF REVIEW CONTEMPLATED BY THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE.
(Responding to State's Brief at Point VI, pp. 2627)
Extraordinary writs are fundamentally different than the
type of judicial review contemplated by the separation of powers
doctrine.

" [T]he writ can neither substitute for, nor perform the

function of, regular appellate review."
P.2d 516, 519

(Utah 1994)

Parsons v. Barnes. 871

(citing Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d

1101, 1104 (Utah 1983)) . The writ of habeas corpus has always been
available.

See U.S. Const, art. I, section 9, clause 2; Utah

Const,

I,

art

requires

section

direct

5.

appellate

The

separation

review

exercises judicial functions.

when

of powers

the

executive

doctrine
branch

Allowing writs to substitute for

direct review writes the separation of powers doctrine out of
existence.
11

The PSRB exercised a judicial

function.

Mr. Dall's

appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. An unconstitutional
delegation of judicial power has occurred.

The order of the PSRB

must be vacated.

POINT VII. THE PSRB HEARING WAS A CRITICAL STAGE
OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MR. DALL.
(Responding to State's Brief at Point VII, pp. 2728)
Because the PSRB was performing a sentencing function,
and made the first and only determination that Mr. Dall should go
to prison, the PSRB hearing was a critical stage in the proceedings
against Mr. Dall.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing and his Opening Brief, Mr. Dall
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order of the PSRB
transferring him to the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

C&L day of September, 1994.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
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ADDENDUM A
Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(R. 546-554)

J

MARK R. MOFFAT (5112)
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (5481)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
.£••
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
Attorneys for Petitioner Kirk W. Dall
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KIRK W. DALL,

: PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,

:

v.

:

STATE OF UTAH, THE UTAH STATE
BOARD OF PARDONS, and THE UTAH
STATE PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY
REVIEW BOARD,
Respondents.

:
Case No. 910902993-HC
:
The Honorable LESLIE A. LEWIS

Petitioner KIRK W. DALL, through his attorneys Mark R.
Moffat and Robert K. Heineman, respectfully submits his proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

These findings are

drafted in accordance with the Court's minute entry dated August
13, 1993, and are intended to accurately reflect the Court's
actual ruling.

Petitioner intimates no opinion as to the

correctness of any of these findings and conclusions, and
reserves all issues for appeal.

Findings and conclusions not

actually included in the Court's minute entry or enclosed in
brackets.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner's request for extraordinary relief was

originally filed May 10, 1991, and was subsequently amended.

^ s\ r-

A />

2.
(c), and

]

Petitioner seeks relief under Rule[s] 65B

[(b),

(e). Petitioner challenges the finding of the

Psychiatric Security Review Board ("PSRB") that Mr. Dall has
received "maximum benefit from treatment" and should be
transferred to the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons.
3.

On May 9, 1989, Mr. Dall entered a plea of guilty

and mentally ill to one count of Forcible Sexual Abuse and one
count of kidnapping, both second degree felonies.

Judge Timothy

R. Hanson ordered that Mr. Dall be transported to the Utah State
Hospital for diagnostic evaluation.
4.

On August 10, 1989 Judge Hanson issued on order

transferring Mr. Dall to the jurisdiction of the PSRB.
[

5.

The PSRB held a hearing on April 19, 1991, and

entered its order dated April 24, 1991, finding that Mr. Dall had
received maximum benefit, and should be transferred to the
jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons.
6.

3

Petitioner filed his petition on May 10, 1991. An

appeal to the Court of Appeals was also filed.
obtained from Judge Scott Daniels.

A stay was

Upon Judge Daniels'

retirement, Judge Iwasaki was assigned.

He recused himself, and

this Court was appointed.
[

7.

Due to a problem with the recording equipment

used, no record was made of the April hearing.
8.
J/

An additional hearing was held on July 28, 1991

and has been transcribed.

]

[
hearing.

9.

The State called no witnesses at the June 28

Dr. Philip Washburn was called and examined by counsel

for Mr. Dall, and cross-examined by the State.

Dr. Washburn

testified that Mr. Dall had NOT received maximum benefit from
treatment, and that Mr. Dall must receive treatment for the rest
of his life.

Dr. Washburn testified that Mr. Dall had reached a

plateau in his treatment and was not progressing as rapidly as
the hospital would like, but that Mr. Dall would still benefit
from further treatment at the hospital.
10.

]

On July 2, 1991 the PSRB issued a second order

finding that Mr. Dall had received maximum benefit and should be
transferred to the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons.
[

11. At the time Mr. Dall was committed to the

jurisdiction of the PSRB, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(6) provided
for judicial review of determinations of the PSRB.
[

12.

]

Effective March 13, 1990, § 77-38-2(6) was amended

to provide appeal only for persons found not guilty by reason of
insanity.
[

]
13.

Effective March 13, 1990, § 77-16a-5 was enacted,

providing a maximum benefit standard for transfer from the
hospital.

(This section was repealed July 1, 1992, but the same

standard is currently codified in § 77-16a-203(3)(a)(ii).)
[

14.

]

Mr. Dall appealed the PSRB's decision to the Court

of Appeals# but the appeal was dismissed for lack of

3
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jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals found that Mr. Dall had no

right of appeal from the PSRB's decision.
15.

]

An evidentiary hearing before this Court was held

on June 14, 1993, with closing arguments heard on August 4, 1993.
16.

At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Verville testified

on behalf of the State that the hospital did not interpret the
maximum benefit standard as relaxing the standard for transfer of
a person to the Board of Pardons.

He-otatcd that Lhe " itiaximmn —

/

htanfarrl l " nf.anrinrfl in rommpnrnirnt,nt -in arpl X^ntio^r^^trri

fh°

"

'clinical criteiia lui Lite "sufficiently recoveredir""stctndard,-

V \J

uliniual Learn recomm^hd^ when a patient ha3 received:-as
imirh^nlininnl

«»i'uii"*M

w.^an

ng

nr

hPnpfif

fn

t-haf-

patient

at

-fehe^hQS£ital.
[

17. Mr. Verville testified that the hospital 'is and

wag at all timco- unaware of the correct legal standard f o r —
df t--raneg-Fg>-g^if patHgni-g

/

c*v_(/

x

Frnm

I-tin arafP-Vi^pifnl

j

nnrV^norzsty

their own fclinical* standard rflgin'illnwn uf M m i ^ i

[

applied

.standard in

18. This Court issued its minute entry decision on

August 13, 1993.
[

]

19. Petitioner filed post judgment motions pursuant to

Rules 52(a), 59(e), and 62(b) and (d) on August 19, 1992. In
this Court's absence, am ex parte stay order was signed by
Presiding Judge Michael R. Murphy, pending further order of this
Court.

]
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Petitioner's request for relief is denied.

2.

This action is properly analyzed under Rule 65B(e)

[

("where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or
abused its discretion").

To the extent petitioner relies on Rule

65B(b) (wrongful imprisonment) and Rule 65B(c) (other wrongful
restraints on personal liberty), such claims are found to be
inappropriate and are dismissed with prejudice.
3.
in effect1)

OTsah Code Ann. § 77-16-5
]

]

[ /(enacted 1980, still

provides, "A person committed to the state

hospital after sentence\who has sufficiently recovered from his
mental disease or defect dijall be certified to the Board of
Pardons.
[

4.

"Sufficiently ^trecdyered from his mental disease or

defect" means

5.

"Maximum b e n e f i t from treatment%means

^hn Cmirr'n
min"1"* Hnm'm'*n in,-.. ••• i i v stated tjhnr
n
st
<r-gta€uta was rgp ft1«'* in ^ ^ — f - t i o ki
i n £&&c stiIT"~lu
ed

rhT>

nn^^n

6.

There is no substantive difference, at least in

their application, between the phrases "maximum benefit" and

y

"StegflCifellLiy recevereaT^—no codified in^the statute
[

7.

The state hospital's transfer policies and
AA^

procedures for transfer under the "sufficiently recovmed"

yi

^7's2A

standard were not arbitrary and capricious, and were in
conformity with the requiremonto of ETVy-lfe-S-r[

8-

j^^p^r^r-pf}"

-

]

Because transfer under the " suIIiiieiiLly"

pfran^ajsrl

and

Hift

"mnv^nm

hnnftf-it-"

rfnnHnrH

in

fptv

(Z^yi <&T JCU, +y~^
&b '**'
/>$&/5 JU^^^SJ
JW-VC
fan
ifitTEnlCb and purposes identical, application of the "maximum

xl 1

*^£

benefit" standard to Mr. Ball does not make imposition of Mr.
Ball's punishment more burdensome, and thus does not violate the
ex post

facto
9.

clauses of the federal or Utah constitutions.

]

The conditions at the Utah State Prison do not

constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The mental health unit

at the Utah State Prison is capable of meeting Mr. Ball's medical
and mental health needs, as they presently exist.
[

10. frho Ut-erir-gt^fee Prison

^^

capable of meeting Mr. Ball's safety needs, and protecting Mr.
Ball from predation and harm from other inmates.
11.

^i

]

A review of the 30 page settlement reached between

the parties in Henry v. Beland. Civil No. 89-C-1124J (B. Utah)
convinces the Court that the facilities at the mental health unit
6
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***

are ^[ will be—3-

neither inadequate, nor cruel and unusual*

[ ail such time as the prison achieves lull compliance wiLh Lhe
-"•"settlement—J-—:
12.

The treatment issues and Mr. Dall's mental

condition, and the appropriateness of his transfer from the state
hospital to the jurisdiction of the state's Board of Pardons, are
all issues that are particularly within the expertise of the
PSRB.
13.

The Board was not exercising a clearly judicial

function when it transferred jurisdiction of Mr. Dall to the
Board of Pardons.

Judge Hanson had already carried out the

judicially-authorized function of imposing sentence in 1989.

The

Board was merely carrying out that sentence in accordance with
their lawful powers and authority.
14.

Where there is no statute specifically authorizing

judicial review, review may be had by "traditional means" of
extraordinary writ.
15.

The PSRB's action does not violate the separation

of powers provision of the Utah Constitution.
[

16.

The lack of an appeal right from decisions of the

PSRB for persons other than those found not guilty by reason of
insanity does not violate Mr. Dall's right to appeal under
Article I, §§ 7 and 12, and Article VIII# § 5 of the Utah
Constitution.

]
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17,

The a c t i o n s of the PSRB were n e i t h e r a r b i t r a r y ,

c a p r i c i o u s , nor unlawful.

y4-—The PSRD's d e c i a i o n i o cpipfported

—by Lilt* lolioWliig-^^rideng^j

z
x
18.

.

]

>T>SRB'
TheT>SRB's
transfer decision was not the

imposition of a sentence, but merely the execution of a lawfully
imposed sentence.

The hearing before the PSRB was not a critical

stage of the proceedings entitling petitioner to compulsory
process

[ or financial access to expert testimony
19.

]

The petitioner's request that the decision of the

PSRB be set aside is denied.
[

20.

This Court's order $7

^fnypi r^^rcj '^

^C^hlUj- ^&J

W^.,

nnim1 iMn 'T ^ " H H nir i r' iIMln ju'ljmrnl

morions
I

2Tz
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4—3—±s not
gfaygri pnnrHng a ^ j j i i a l 8
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Respectfully submitted this 20th day of September,
1993.

Mark R. Moffat

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing PROPOSED FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be delivered to Lorenzo K.
Miller and James H. Beadles, the Attorney General's Office, 330
South, 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 2-0

day of

September, 1993.

Robert K./Heineman

DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of September, 1993.

9

ADDENDUM B
"Plateau" testimony of Dr. Philip Washburn at June 28, 1991 PSRB
hearing. (PSRB at 39-45, 60)

perhaps In a well-structured halfway house with regulating his
medications from that setting. With a person who has his kind
of disorder and illness, then with chargesf we have the extra
problem of the danger that comes from that part of his
personality and his illness, the paraphilia. That makes it a
management problem In terms of safety to the community and to
him.

Bradshaw:

Let me change it a bit.

Let me add to my

hypothetical world if I can. Not only are we not dealing with
management decisions because of overcrowding in the Hospital,
but we are also assuming in my hypothetical that Mr. Dall is
in a secure setting where he is not released to the community,
where the threat to the community is not an issue.

And my

question to you would be, given that hypothetical world,
whether or not, in your opinion, strictly as a psychiatrist,
whether or not he has received the maximum

benefit that

treatment can provide to him?

Washburn:

Maximum hospital benefit?

Bradshaw:

Maximum benefit from treatment?

Washburn:

No.

No.

Again, when we talk about maximum or we

talk about ongoing treatment, I think we have trouble in terms
of our thinking, the maximum in a way has to be ongoing.

39

He

must stay on the medication.
would needs

It would be like a diabetic

to be on insulin, keep a diet, keep all those

things good and stable and if they do not they can have a
reoccurrence of their illness obviously.

Bradshaw:

Is it fair to say that this goes back to my

questions about curing and fixing as opposed to maintaining?

Washburn:

That's part of it, right.

Bradshaw:

That the nature of your profession is such that

when you speak of treatment it doesn't mean cure or fix it
means...

Washburn:

Certainly not, in these kinds of illnesses.

Now

there may be some people we can cure and fix, but that have
very limited kinds of emotional disorders that might "cured"
in terms of the situation or the event that is occurring right
at the time; but these kind of major mental illnesses, their
natural history is one of continued symptoms, particularly
under stress.

It's a continually ongoing treatment, it's a

maximum treatment. I mean continuing treatment has to be part
of it.

The question gets to be in what setting.

Obviously,

in this day and age there's getting to be more pressures to
not have people in expensive hospital settings. So part of the
one is economics, get this person out of the hospital as soon
40

as possible, get them into another setting and continue the
treatment there. This is what we would be doing with Kirk if
he didn't have this sentence and the other complications of
his disorders. Ideally, my way of thinking would be that the
people who are guilty but mentally ill ought to have a system
different from the prison system in which we could have a
hospital
for the acute, more severe.

A secure place for them at the

time of needing the treatment.

Secure residential programs

where they could be transferred when the acutef more intense
treatment was not needed, but where there would be security
for both the client/patient/inmate. I don't want to call that
name and society.

But, it would be one system and the prison

system to my way of thinking would not be the best system.
The reality is that's the alternative we have at this point
and we've made the recommendation. Not that Kirk can't benefit
from someone continuing to follow him with the medication,
making adjustments over a period of a number of months and
years, but that he's reaching some sort of plateau and that
our resources our limited.

Bradshaw:

And someone else can more acutely use the bed than

Mr. Dall?

Washburn:

That's correct.

41

Bradshaw:

But in terns, and I know you've responded to it,

but let me just try and get you to respond again.

In terms

of whether he's received the maximum benefit, if we assume my
hypothetical
issuesf

that we're not dealing with those economic

would it be your opinion that he has not received

maximum benefit?

Washburn:

If I had other resources he would be in the other

resources like a well managed, well structured residential
setting.

Bradshaw:

And you would prefer to treat him in that setting?

Washburn:

Oh yes, yea.

Bradshaw:

In your opinion as a psychiatrist, this standard of

maximum

benefit from treatmentf does it make, is that a

difficult standard for you?

Does it cause you difficulties?

Washburn:

It causes me difficulty.

Bradshaw:

Could you tell us why?

Washburn:

For the very reasons I've been trying to talk

around and to.

It has the connotation or implication that

okay, now we're cured.

It's like okay we've given all the
42

chemotherapy to cure that cancer we can, or we've given all
the antibiotic we need to do.

Or we've done the surgery now

*wH the surgery's done and we've gotten them through the postop period and now they can go out and have received maximum
hospital benefit.

That's, I think, the place r have trouble.

The model just doesn't quite fit my way of thinking for a
severe and mentally-ill psychiatric patients.

Bradshaw:

You mentioned with Mr. Dall and with persons with

similar diagnosis that there is a need

for lesser treatments

at times and more intensive treatments at times.

I take it

that's inherent with the type of illness?

Washburn:

Yes, yes.

circumstances.

There's exacerbations depending on the

Maybe

extra

stress

that

can

cause

it.

Sometimes the exacerbations occur and we don't even know why.

Bradshaw:

And so there are times when they can be out in the

community or in a less-structured setting and there are times
when they may need hospitalization?

Washburn:

That's correct.

Bradshaw: Oo you foresee in Kirk's future that there may come
a

r^mm when

he

would

need

hospitalization again?
43

renewed

hospitalization

or

Washburn:

Well, it's possible.

Bradshawt

I think that's all I have Doctor, thank you.

Washburn:

Thank you.

Chair:

Hunt:

Oo you have any questions, Mr. Hunt?

Yes, I'd like you to just basically

go through and

give the reasoning you've given, bits and pieces, throughout
your testimony so far; but I'd like you to tell the Board why
you have come to the conclusion that at this point Kirk has
received maximum benefits
at the hospital, from his hospital stay.

Washburn:

I don't think I've ever used the word maximum.

Hunt: Oh, okay.

Why is it your recommendation at this point

that Kirk is ready to be moved on to the Board of Pardons?

If

that's your recommendation?

Washburn:

That was our recommendation.

In terms of the

thinking, with the charge and the seriousness of the charge
obviously, we felt he was not, that he still presents a risk
and a danger and that he does need a secure facility.

And

that with the sentence and the charges that would seem logical

44

that the facility would be the prison sen-ting*
some resources.

They do have

It is not a hospital/ I'm mean we're not

saying we're transferring him from one hospital to another,
we're saying we're transferring him from a hospital to a
prison secure setting. But they do have some resources there
in terms of follow-up medications. In terms of the medication
we have spent timef we've found what I think is a good
combination of medications that if he is followed in that
setting, where there is someone following him, then they
should be able to do that. He's plateauing, he's coming to a
point to where the amount of benefit coming from what we do is
diminishing in terms of return.

Hunt:

I see. Is it fair to say that Kirk in the past has been

resistant to treatment?

Washburn: Yes, that's correct.

Hunt:

Is it fair to say that in the past he has felt that he

understands his needs better than the professionals treating
him?

Washburn:

Hunt:

7es, he's made statements quite similar to that.

Let me ask you a little bit more about the treatment

that may be available at the Utah State Prison.
4S

I understand

unit of some I guess it was almost 30 patients. Dennis could
tell us about that. Because of these other demands we've had
to make a choice there too.

Chairs

Would you say that Mr. Oall then, has, generally

speaking, plateaued out as far as the benefits from hospital
stay is concerned.

Washburn:

Yes, I think that would be maybe a fair and

accurate way to say it.

Chair:

Okay, I believe that is all I have to question now.

I turn the time back for should we say a brief rebuttal.

Bradshaw:

A brief, a brief, very brief. You spoke of the

number of people who are at the prison, and I don't think you
specifically referred to them as mentally ill offenders, but
I assume that's what you were talking about including organic
and mental retardation that are at the prison.

Washburn: Organic mental retardation, people who are mentally
ill, who may ave been mentally ill and the crime was a direct
product of that mental illness or who have "anti-social*9
personalities who become mentally ill and psychotic there.

Bradshaw: These people who suffer this mental illness who are

60

ADDENDUM C
Economic considerations testimony of Dr. Philip Washburn at June
28, 1991 PSRB hearing. (PSRB at 21-22, 49-51)

competent, they would be sent back for further treatment until
they theoretically would become competent. And also those who
were guilty and mentally ill, would be also treated here. So
you can see that the increase in the demands on this resource
have been significant.

We have those pressures, those are

realities. A person who is guilty and mentally ill who comes
under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board, if we feel the person is coming to some point where
weighing the amount of resources we have, we have limited
beds, and we feel that perhaps that person has reached a
plateau of stability/ then we come to the Board to request
permission to have some management decision made.

At this

point with the limited resources we have here and with the
structure of the system of the State, we need to do that.
This past year our unit has been running 110% of occupancy.
I think that figure tells you what the resources and the
pressures on us are.

You ask me on one individual person.

Has he reached maximum hospital benefit?

Ideally, a person

who would be judged guilty and mentally ill, I feel, ideally
should be in a hospital setting or an alternative in which
there would be very close psychiatric medical supervision for
the period of time they would be sentenced.

Obviously, the

numbers of people coming through the court system that would
be adjudicated guilty and mentally ill could result in quite
a number of beds that would be needed. There are alternatives
to hospital beds, if you have the right structure, such as

21

half-way houses where the monitoring of the medications could
be done with the right kind of structure and the right kind of
resources.

That is to say at this point if we did not have

the sentence of the charge then perhaps Mr. Dall could be
cared for in some very secure residential setting other than
a

hospital setting.

But, obviously, it would need to be a

very well-structured program with security for both the client
or patient and society.

Bradshaw: Let me, if I can, direct you away from Mr. Dall for
a minute and away from the hospital setting, and just ask
generally in your field, in psychiatry.

When we talk about a

person who has this lifelong history of psychotic thinking,
when we talk in terms of treatment, what generally do you as
a psychiatrist envision in terms of treatment for someone with
that type of problem?

Washburn:

I don't know.

Are you supposing this person does

not have charge or a sentence?

Bradshaw:

Yes, I am assuming that.

Washburn:

If the person did not have a serious charge or

sentence, there are many individuals I care for who have this
diagnosis, I care for on an outpatient basis with medication
checks as I indicated before, every four, six, eight weeks,

22

Hunt:

So it would be fair then to say that very few of the

patients that you have seen in here would actually benefit, if
economics were not a factor, very few would actually benefit
from a transfer to the State Prison?

Washburn:

To the State Prison. That's an excellent and good

question and I haven't kept that close of track of it. But as
a general feeling I believe that of many, many of the people
that come here, there are some exceptions, but many of the
people that come here through the system have benefitted from
the system. On the end of the evaluation process I think that
there has been a fairly good selection and a there's been a
good reason to question if they were competent or not.
think we've offered a good service there.

So I

In terms of the

guilty but mentally ill, there is a percentage where I feel
there needs to be a little tighter, better evaluation.
they truly mentally ill and guilty?

Are

That there are some that

do slip through, that if we broaden it too much then, of
course, many personality disorders could fit into that kind of
system.

Then we would be overwhelmed and they would not

benefit and they don't need hospitalization.

Hunt:

Okay.

Would it be fair to say that economics is an

inherent part of the science that you practice in terms of you
are always confronted as a professional with balancing the
interest

of

the

person

against
49

the

resources

that

are

available?

Washburn:

Is that a fair statement to make?

We try to.

I guess as professionals we try to not

allow that to be the major reason why we're making a decision
for hospitalization or certain kinds of treatment, but I think
in the area of mental illness, it's more, more of a problem
than in the other illnesses because in many other physical
illnesses there can be - cures".

There can be surgery that is

short term and you have much better parameters to work with.
Where as inherently in major mental illness particularly, it's
something that takes time and that time seems to be the thing
that creates costs.

Hunt: Would your conclusion that Kirk has reached his plateau
be the same even if Kirk was not a criminal commitment here,
even if for say he was a private individual and we did not
have the criminal sentence to deal with and we did not have
the sexual aspects? Would your conclusion that he has reached
a plateau of treatment and that he is ready to move on to
another facility be the same?

Washburn:

Without those factors probably we could have moved

him on sometime ago.

Hunt: Now there's been some talk of maximum treatment benefit
or m^yjTTmTw hospital benefit.
SO

You have testified that the

treatment itself will have to continue probably for his entire
life so he has not reached perhaps the pinnacle of his
treatment.

Is that correct? But in terms of maximum hospital

benefit, would it be your conclusion that at this point he has
reached a maximum hospital benefit that can be attained given
resources available at the hospital?

Washburn:

He can still benefit from being in the Hospital.

But we have to weigh the costs and benefits••

Hunt: Okay, and that gets back to our ideal world situation.
Is it your point, is it your conclusion at this point that we
have reached the marginal return, a point of diminishing
returns

or

declining

marginal

returns

in

terms

of

expectations ?

Washburn:

Hunt:

I'm not sure declining, but maybe diminishing.

Okay.

And is....I don't think I have any further

questions.

Chair:

Thank you, Mr. Hunt.

Brads haw:

Chair:

I have a couple of quick follow-ups, if I might?

Could we wait until we're all through?
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Then I will

ADDENDUM D
Selected Statutory Provisions

Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-241 (Supp. 1992) provides:
62A-12-241.
Release of patient to receive other
treatment -- Placement in more restrictive environment -Procedures.
(1) The director or his designee may release an
improved patient to less restrictive treatment as may be
specified by the director or his designee, and agreed to
in writing by the patient. Whenever the director or his
designee determines that the conditions justifying
commitment no longer exist, the patient shall be
discharged.
If the patient has been committed through
judicial
proceedings,
a
report
describing
that
determination shall be sent to the clerk of the court
where the proceedings were held.
(2) (a)
The director or his designee
is
authorized to issue an order for the immediate
placement of a patient not previously released
from an order of commitment into a more
restrictive environment, if the director or his
designee has reason to believe that the less
restrictive environment in which the patient has
been placed is aggravating the patient's mental
illness as defined in Subsection 62A-12-234 (10),
or that the patient has failed to comply with the
specified treatment plan to which the patient had
agreed in writing.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-5 (1990) (enacted 1980) provides:
77-16-5.

Recovery of committed person -- Certification
to Board of Pardons.

(1) A person committed to the state hospital after
sentence who has sufficiently recovered from his mental
disease or defect shall be certified to the Board of
Pardons by the clinical director.
Upon certification, jurisdiction over the person
shall be transferred to the Board of Pardons and he shall
be pardoned, paroled, or confined in the state prison for
the unexpired term of the offense as provided by law with
credit for time served while confined at the hospital.
The certification of the clinical director of the
hospital shall specify with particularity the medical
facts justifying his certification.
(2) The provisions of law and the rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, regarding
parole shall apply to persons paroled from the state
hospital.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5

(effective March 13, 1990)

(repealed July 1, 1992) provided:
77-16a-5.

Discharge from psychiatric Security Review
Board -- Board of Pardons -- Parole -- Review.

With regard to mentally ill but not mentally retarded
persons:
(1) Every six months, the Psychiatric Security
Review Board shall review the condition of each
person
under
its
jurisdiction
at
the
state
hospital, to determine whether custody should be
transferred to the Board of Pardons.
(2)
(a) If at any time after commitment of a
person to the hospital under Section 77-16a-4
whose
sentence
has not
expired,
if
the
superintendent
of
the
hospital,
or
his
designee, is of the opinion that the person:
(i)
is no longer mentally ill, or (ii)
is
still mentally ill and continues to be a
danger to himself or others, but can be
controlled if proper care, medication, and
treatment are provided, and, in either case,
(iii) has reached maximum benefit from the
programs at the hospital, the superintendent
or his designee shall apply to the Psychiatric
Security Review Board for a transfer
of
custody to the Board of Pardons.
(b) The application shall be accompanied by
a report setting forth the facts supporting
the opinion of the superintendent or his
designee, which shall include the clinical
facts, the diagnosis, the course of treatment
received at the hospital, the prognosis of the
remission of the symptoms, the potential for
recidivism and the danger to himself
or
others, and the recommendations for future
treatment. If the recommendations included in
the application involve treatment
in the
community
under
conditions
of
parole
or
conditional release, the application must also
be
accompanied
by
a
verified
plan
of
treatment.
(3)
(a) When the Psychiatric Security Review
Board proposes to transfer custody of
a
defendant from the Utah State Hospital to the
Board of Pardons prior to the expiration of
sentence, it shall transmit to the Board of
Pardons a report on the condition of the
defendant, including all pertinent information
supplied
by
the
superintendent
or
his
designee.

(b) The Psychiatric Security Review Board
may make recommendations to the Board of
Pardons as follows:
(i) that the defendant serve any or
all of his unexpired term of sentence at
the state prison;
(ii) that the defendant be placed on
parole; or
(iii)
that
the
defendant
be
recommitted to the jurisdiction of the
Psychiatric Security Review Board for
conditional release in accordance with
Chapter 38 of this title.
(c) If the Psychiatric Security Review
Board recommends to the Board of Pardons that
a defendant be placed on parole or be placed
under
its
jurisdiction
for
conditional
release,
it
shall
submit
with
that
recommendation a specific program for the
care, custody, and treatment of the defendant.
If
the
defendant
is
placed
under
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Psychiatric
Security
Review Board by the Board of Pardons for
conditional release, failure to complete that
program shall be grounds for revocation of
conditional release in accordance with Chapter
38 of this title.
(d) The Board of Pardons shall direct that
the defendant
serve any or
all
of
the
unexpired term of the sentence at the Utah
State Prison, place the defendant on parole,
or commit the defendant to the jurisdiction of
the Psychiatric Security Review Board for
conditional release in accordance with Chapter
38.
(e) Pending action of the Board of Pardons,
the
defendant
shall
remain
under
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Psychiatric
Security
Review Board at the Utah State Hospital.
(4)
(a) If the defendant is placed on parole,
treatment shall, upon the recommendation of
the Psychiatric Security Review Board, be made
a condition of parole.
Failure to continue
treatment or other condition of parole except
by agreement with the designated mental health
services provider and the Board of Pardons is
a basis for initiation of parole violation
hearings by the Board of Pardons.
(b) The period of parole may not be for
fewer than five years or until the expiration
of the defendant's sentence, whichever occurs
first,
and
may
not
be
reduced
without
consideration by the Board of Pardons of a

current report on the mental health status of
the offender.

